Toward Deontological Social Sciences 147 ment'. 'Commitment is, of course, closely connected with one's morals ', Sen explains (ibid., p. 329) . The significance of the concept of commitment, he elaborates, is that it points to a source of preference, or value, other than being 'better off'.
Note, though, that none of the three authorities identifies their concept with moral duties or values. For Frankfurt, the second-order faculty is akin to the first order one; both are 'desires'. Hirschman's meta-preferences could be based on aesthetic considerations, or enlightened (longer run) self-interest. Sen's commitments come close but are. not outright moral derivatives. Indeed, there is no reason to doubt that second-order considerations may be derived from many sources, and may be justified on many grounds. However, we suggest , that moral commitments are a major, if not the major, source of secondorder judgments, and a major way they are evaluated. Deontological ethics, with its preoccupation with intentions and their ethical standing, is particularly suited to explore the source and standing of these moral commitments. Above all, we suggest, adding the dimension of moral intentions, moral commitments, and duties to one's paradigm enriches the foundations of social sciences in general and of economics in particular, as we shall attempt to show next. ( Deontological ethics encompasses many positions on other issues. These are not explored here because one can draw on the basic perspective, as just outlined, without necessarily subscribing to those other positions. For example, one can be a deontologist without accepting Kant's view that only the noumenal self has a free will).
THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIAL ORDER
At the core of most social science paradigms is an explicit or implicit concept of human nature and of social order. We explore first the concept of human nature. The major social science paradigm in the West is the neoclassical one, which is utilitarian both in origin and in much of its contemporary content. At the core of the neoclassical paradigm, shared by neoclassical economics, 'exchange' sociology, Public Choice political science, and several other social science theories, is the concept of a unitary person, a well ordered bundle of self-directed urges, expressed in the actor's preferences. The actor is viewed as an autonomous individual, acting on his or her own, the well known homoeconomicus.
What concept of human nature emerges from the de ontological position? First of all, a view of the person as a divided self. The person is in perpetual conflict between two or more internal forces. Kant distinguishes between two 'men', found within each of us. One is instrumental, seeking efficient means, directly observable. The other is the seat of free-will and values, the world of 'reason', which leads to recognition of i I J moral imperatives. The first 'man' acts out inclinations; the second-in pursuit of what is right. The first is determined by nature, the second is free.. Freud's distinction between an id and a super-ego capture the conflict between urges and socially introduced morality. (Internalized, and individually honed, morality is placed in the ego itself). Schelling (1984) collected numerous examples of individuals who find themselves simultaneously S"ubjected to conflicting preferences. Elster (1985) provides an excellent overview of various theories about the nature and dynamics of the divided self.
The question raises itself, if both urges and moral commitments reflect to a significant extent social forces (socialization and social control), and to some extent one's individual development, why do they tend to diverge? Why are the urges not' socialized' to the point they conform to morally prescribed behaviour? The observed fact is that urges and moral commitments are often in conflict (Etzioni 1988) . Indeed, most moral duties and commitments are expressed in terms of prohibiting acts individuals would be otherwise inclined to engage in (e.g., adultery, theft) or require acts they would otherwise not perform (e.g., giving to charity). Among the possible explanations is that urges are closer to the biological base of human behaviour than morality, i.e., reflect a lesser extent of socialization and internal development. Another possible explanation is that they reflect different stages of socialization (urges precede moral education, in that sense, are more infantile).
Aside from being of general interest, the concept of the divided self has significant implications for the understanding of economic behaviour. It helps explain why all items (commodities, resources, transactions) have two valuations: their economic value and their moral standing. For instance, a stolen product can be used like one that has been legitimately acquired, but its moral standing is hardly equivalent. It has been suggested that this distinction does not hold for most, mundane, purchases. But a moral dimension is often readily discernible and always present. It affects all purchases that are considered 'sinful' but not illegal, for example alcohol and cigarettes (as reflected, for instance, in special taxes imposed on them); it is evident in illegal work (in the underground economy) and trade (e.g. in controlled substances); it is reflected in preference for American vs. 'foreign' products, from 'JAP' cars to Mexican lettuce; it can be discerned in the condemnation of 'junk' food, food high in calories, salt, and cholesterol (considered irresponsible toward self); in the production of products that are environmentally dubious, marketing via persuasive advertising, and in the propensity to save, to conserve energy, to pay taxes, to work hard and so on. (For evidence, see Etzioni, 1988.) In still other areas, moral commitments go beyond influencing transactions-they taboo exchange behaviour and market orientations.
Various philosophers have identified numerous areas in which exchanges are 'blocked' (Okan 1975 , Walzer 1983 , for example those covered by constitutional rights. Thus, First Amendment rights cannot be sold or bought and contracts to enslave are not enforceable. The recent court battle over the question whether or not contracts to 'sell' babies conceived by surrogate mothers are enforceable is, in effect, on the question where the market zone ends and blocked exchanges start.
Next to drawing on a concept of human nature, social science paradigms build on a related concept, that of a social order, on the ways the individuals-given their nature-combine into sustainable wholes. Indeed, historians of science suggest that the social sciences evolved once religious conceptions of social order broke down and the quest was on for secular accounts of order i1.l society.
At the heart of the question what accounts for order, is the question whether order must be introduced, say by force, by a powerful authority, or-does it arise naturally? Deontological social sciences find the answer, first and foremost, in the moral order. Individuals' interests are not assumed to be naturally harmonious, i.e., mutually supportive and compatible, or made to be so by an invisible hand. Nor is there a reason to assume order must be imposed on individuals who are, in Hobbes' term, wolf to one another. The social realm and its order are based on the assumptions that individuals have acquired a set of shared moral commitments that legitimate the social order and that lead them to treat others the way they seek to be treated themselves.
The logical next step for a deontological social science is to deal with the question: what are the sources of the moral commitments? This is a question utilitarian social scientists need not deal with because they take individual preferences as their starting point (e.g., in the concept of consumer sovereignty). The deontological answer is a dual one: in part, the sources of individual commitments are moral values shared by the community of which individuals are members; in part, they are the result of internal moral individual developments.
Regarding communities' values, the main point is that individuals internalize those and make them part of their inner self; they are turned from constraints (matters the community demands, one more external condition the actors take into account in their deliberations) into meta-I' preferences and preferences (criteria the actors use to judge the course '. .of action or form, in part, their decision in the first place). In contrast, ! utilitarians, to the extent they recognize community values at all, see .them as external factors. For example, according to utilitarian social psychology, an actor who faces group pressures to conform, say to donate blood, will calculate whether or not the costs of disregarding these moral expectations, of not conforming, exceeds the benefits (let's say of being socially accepted). Deontologists recognize that values are -, 't')t reated that way in some occasions, but also recognize that on other ;'1 occasions, following internalization, individuals either see the donation of blood as the right thing to do from their viewpoint or something they are compelled to do. That is, one cannot argue from the existence of expedient morality that authentic moral commitments do not exist, Or .., are insignificant. Moreover, to deny that internalization occurs is, in effect, to deny the existence of education. It leaves the neoclassicists with the odd implicit assumption that persons are born biologically and psychologically mature, roughly at the age of 18 to 21 if not older.
While the community often accounts for a significant part of a person's moral commitments, in part these moral commitments are internally developed. One important source for such individualization, is the fact that in many societies individuals are frequently subject to conflicting societal demands (of~n from different social groups, such as immigrant, kin, and ethnic groups vs. the encompassing community). This leaves the individuals freer to choose which moral code to follow. Also, moral socialization and social control are often far from complete, leaving room for individuals to develop their own position (often more in the extent to adherence, than in content). Finally, exceptional individuals rise, who fashion their own codes and-affect that of the community (e.g., Luther). Still, all these individual developments are best studied on the backdrop of shared social values, and the examination of the societal structures that encourage or discourage individualization, because they account for most of the variance.
What are the implications of these divergent views of moral codes for the specific views of social order? Utilitarians see individuals as autonomous, psychologically self-sufficient, as 'under-socialized' (Granovetter 1985) . They see the social order as arising out of either a deliberate contract among free-standing individuals, or as a natural result of their each pursuing his or her self-interest. Groups and communities are either ignored or 'reduced' to aggregations of individual choices, deemed to have no attributes of their own.
In contrast, deontological social scientists recognize that because individuals have a debased element, a 'lower' self, they may be prone to war with one another, and hence there is a need to foster a social order. The question is: how and to what extent is this achieved? The notion that order may be imposed by a government, is found to be unsatisfactory .because coercion leads to alienation and rebellion, and because of practical limitations on the ability to govern those opposed. There are never enough police to control a community whose members are actively opposed to an authority, and-who shall police the police? are familiar arguments that apply here. That is, only a government that is viewed as legitimate by a significant part of the community, and-to a -significant extent of the total scope of action, can provide a social order. . Legitimacy, in turn, rests on being in line with accepted moral values. Hence, ultimately the social order rests on the moral community, not on the government. The moral community benefits from social bonds that tie people to one another. Individuals, as psychic entities, are not self-sufficient but require one another, are in part intertwined in ways they do not relate to objects. Their sense of identity and direction, their ability to function as individuals, their sense of inner stability and self-esteem, are all anchored in other persons and in groups. They are each other's keepers. These bonds of mutuality, are the sociological bases of their treating one another as ends and not merely as means, on which the moral, and in turn the social order, build.
OPENING THE PREFERENCES: CAN BE OPERATIONALIZED
The position outlined so far has a major methodological implication: we need to study the sources of individual preferences. Neoclassicists take these preferences as given and as stable, that is, a person's desires are taken as fixed. The extent to which a person is able to act on his or her preferences, is able to realize them, the factors that account for differences in actual behaviour, are seen as due to differences in constraints (given a particular level of income). For example, a person who desires t o 'buy' higher education, is viewed as likely to buy less (given his or her income) the higher the price, the more requirements are imposed for obtaining each degree, the longer the commute to college, the fewer child care facilities are available and so on. Neoclassicists have opposed 'opening up' the preferences, to see whether behaviour may also change over time because preferences have changed, say because the valuations individuals accord to what they are buying, higher education, have changed. One reason given to this opposition is that neoclassicists argue that the factors that modify preferences cannot be studied empirically because they are irrational (such as value changes, impulses, eruption of social movements). Our response is that one should not confuse the irrationality of the subjects (or the actors), or their value commitments, with those of the observers. That is, we can study scientifically nonrational and even irrational behaviour. Thus, we may examine the effects of bright colours on people shopping, without I being swayed to buy a single item ourself. We may observe that once the ..lead lemming jumps off a cliff others will follow, while we still remain standing at the top. Neoclassicists also argue that values 'cannot' be measured, or, that statements about them are based on 'ephemeral' data, data about states of mind rather than observable behaviour, for example, attitudes and survey data. This criticism is, in part correct. These data, do not provide reliable predictors of behaviour, although predictions based on eco-i ĩ 152 Amitai Etzioni . nomic data often do not fare better. However, there is no reason in principle that the same behavioural data, of the kind used by economists cannot be used to determine the effects of values. We need to go into thi. matter here in some detail because the charge of 'cannot be operationalized' is a serious one. It is tantamount to stating that to study the sources and dynamics of preferences, one must leave the realm of SCience.
To highlight the ways economic behavioural data can be used to study values, we draw on Lancaster's idea ofdisaggregating the attributes of consumer goods, as long as we have repeated observations over time. Lancaster (1966) points out that if we have numerous observations about the price people are paying for a product, say, autos, that varies in several ways, such as colour, design, and size, we can establish how much these people are willing to pay for each attribute, say red colour, four vs. two door, acceleration to 55 miles per hour in less than six seconds, and so on. We suggest that moral and other social valuations can be treated as one or more such attributes. For example in the post World War II era, it was considered unpatriotic to buy foreign cars; in some parts of America there were specially strong anti-Japanese and anti-German valuations. This should be reflected and be measurable in the price like any other attribute of a car. Furthermore, a comparison of the price of similar American and foreign cars over time would allow us to test the hypothesis that values were at work, because we know that over the years between, say, 1955 and 1970, anti-German and antiJapanese valuations have declined significantly. (Further validation could be achieved by another form of disaggregation, by comparing groups within the U.S.A. For example, Jewish groups were in some years slower to accept German cars than other ethnic groups.) Some neoclassicists argue that values are reflected, like many other factors, in the preferences, and there is hence no reason to single them out. They treat, as Mike McPherson put it, a' taste' for peanut butter and the taSte for God as interchangeable. I provided elsewhere some arguments why it seems productive to distinguish between the utility of consumption and that of the affirmation of moral values; deontological ethics provides additional reasons for the distinction as we already outlined. Here a metbodological reason comes into focus: to develop a satisfactory theory of economic behaviour, indeed of behaviour in general, one needs to know, what' drives' preferences rather than take them as God sent or 'given'. Values turn out to be a major factor shaping and reshaping preferences. The next step is to ask what accounts for value changes? Here the role of the education, leadership, the mass media and I social movements, all macro~not intro-individual but collective, his-: torical, institutional factors-come to the forefront. Without a systemat-: ic understanding of these, the dynamic study of behaviour is deeplyI . r lacking.
I THE ANCHORING OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS
The recognition of the moral and social realm as nonreducible, has ano~er major implication: it provides for a rather different conception for understanding the conditions under which liberty will persist rather than be threatened. The reason is closely related to the methodological issue we just explored: the need to open the preferences. This is evident in two main ways: one concerns the reactive nature of the neoclassical individual vs. the active one of the deontological person. The second is evident in the collective anchoring of individual freedoms. The neoclassical paradigm, precisely because it tends to assume that the preferences are fixed, sees behaviour as driven by changes in constraints, i.e., in the environment. The individual may have various wishes, dreams and aspirations,-but these are of little interest to the neoclassicists; what the individuals do, their behaviour, is determined by how ample vs. restrictive the environment is. Thus, if supply is abundant, prices low-people will buy more; and if tight-less. There is no room for a concept of a free will. Behaviour is externally dictated.
It is in the non-rational domain that individuals are free to identify and adopt something on the order of the Kantian or Christian (or any other) ethnic, ..,It is in the non-rational domain that the individual can rightfully be characterized as internally directed as opposed to externally directed as in Becker and Skinner behaviouralism.2 And it is because of the non-rational domain that personal responsibility for actions has any reasonable meaning. In the externally directed world of behaviouralism, all action is a response to external forces and no act, therefore, can be accurately attributed to the individual actor. In fact, Skinner explicitly argues that personal responsibility is an arcane, pre-scientific concept which has no meaning in the world of the behavioral technologist, (McKenzie 1979, p. 152)3 In the deontological paradigm emphasis is put on the individual's intention. In an extreme version this may turn into a futile voluntarism, into the assumption that the individual is a God-like, omnipotent creature, able to fashion the world in his or her image. (This is reflected in some of the writings on legislation and international law that assume that passing a law or signing an international treaty or charter, will have major societal consequences. For example, those who chartered the U.N. in San Francisco after World War II believed they laid the foundation to world peace. For additional discussion of voluntarism see Etzioni 1968). .In moderate versions, which systematically recognize consequences and hence constraints, individuals are seen as struggling to insert their will into a limiting world. They actively approach the world, seeking to advance their goals, but realizing the limits it imposes. Despite the fact that the individual acts are largely or wholly dictated by the environment according to the neoclassical paradigm it sees the individuals as the decision-making unit, because it assumes that their preferences govern. This is much more than a working hypothesis; it is an article of faith grounded in a deep commitment to the value of liberty. Neoclassicists argue that if one assumes that individuals' preferences can be manipulated or changed by social forces, one undermines the foundations of liberty-the notion that each individual is able to render decisions of their own. In contrast, we hold that to recognize that individuals are in part socially shaped is not to argue for a government to make decisions for them, but to acknowledge that need to deal in one's theory with significant historical, cultural, and societal forces. Only when these are allowed into one's paradigm can a systematic search for the conditions under which liberty may be protected from, orenhanced by-these forces, begin.
The insights and findings of psychologists and sociologists, indicate iliat typically cut-off, isolated individuals--'the actors of the neoclassical world, are unable to act freely, while they find that individuals bonded into comprehensive and stable relationships and cohesive groups and communities, are much more able to make sensible choices, render judgment, be free. Indeed, the greatest danger for liberty arises when the social moorings of individuals are cut. The atomization of the society, the reduction of communities into aggregates of isolated individuals results in the individuals' loss of competence, capacity to reason, and self-identity and is the societal condition that has preceded the rise of totalitarian movements and governments. The best protection against totalitarianism is a pluralistic society laced with communities and voluntary associations, as observed so keenly by Alexis de Toc-. queville. The 1& We paradigm is as much concerned with individual liberties as the neoclassical one. However, it assumes that liberty requires a viable, albeit not over-bearing community, and seeks to study the conditions under which such a community evolves and is sustained.
The essence of Fromm's (1941) argument is that freedom has costs. Individuals won autonomy as society changed following industrialization or, more precisely, urbanization. However, Fromm shows, the gain was at the cost of reduced social bonds in the family, and community. This left the individual highly anxious, even hysterical, despairingly looking for synthetic affiliations to replace the lost bonds. Totalitarian political movements are said to appeal to such persons because they provide such bonds. Also, the decline of religion and traditional values, leave people to yearn for firm directions; demagogues and dictators provide such strong leadership. (Another offshoot of this line of reasoning is David Riesman 1950, which argues that people become other-directed, seeking excessively to conform, without inner directions.)
The concept of the mass society points in the same direction. Reference is not to a large number of people per se, although mass relations are less likely to occur in small populations. The essence of the mass society is that it replaced the closely woven social fabric of numerous, small, direct and stable social units (villages) with aggregates of people, each on.their own, somewhat like the mass in a crowded railroad station. Cities were viewed as places where masses of individuals aggregate, but tend not to favour solid social bonds. The high level of geographic mobility, constantly reshuffling individuals, is believed to further flatten ties. Religious and ethnic groups were also seen as losing their hold over people as they join large associations that may represent the interests (e.g., labour unions or political parties), but, at least in the U.S.A. often provide little social cohesion. Mass media directly speaks to individuals. Eruption of massive social movements is seen as a result (Kornhauser 1959) . Many early critics of the mass society saw it as a dangerous result of the transition from an orderly, aristocratic, to a mass-participating, democratic society. De Tocqueville (1835) served as a source for the ã rgument that if the societal fabric is preserved, pluralism maintained, which he found in America, Democracy may be preserved. (While he turned more pessimistic after the 1848 revolution in France, his earlier position was adopted by many).
For those unfamiliar with the social science literature, it must be noted that the preceding statements and findings are challenged, as are most statements and findings in social sciences. Thus, Gans (1962) in a book entitled, The Urban Villagers, showed that there is village-like life in cities. And Srole (1975) works, which showed the negative effect of social isolati9n on mental stability has been criticized on methodological grounds. One learns from the Gans-like studies that the statement about the effects of urbanization must be mitigated; they do not hold (or hold less) for those who can form solid social groups within cities. And, the work of Srole and others must be further verified. Still, the consensus of sociological and psychological work is to lend support to the basic notion, that isolation is incompatible with the condition necessary for 1.
mental stability needed for individuals to be able to form their own judgments and to resist undue external pressure and influence, i.e., that liberty is, to a significant extent, socially anchored.
The preceding discussion provides, at best, the barest outline and elementary rationale for deontological social sciences. Deontological social sciences still require much elaboration and testing before they can provide a full paradigm. Many hundred thousands of man and woman ;;:'.;; I I 156 Amitai Etzioni years that were invested in evolving the neoclassical paradigm and the social sciences build within its confines. Those who are interested in such an endeavour may take heart as they note that many scholars, including several cited above, have been doing deontological work, without the label and the suggested rationale.
